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E PLURIBUS UNUM? THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE AND MEANINGFUL
RECOGNITION OF OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTIONS
Pamela K. Terry*
Parents and children whose legal relationships derive from state
adoption judgments face uncertainty when they travel across state lines.
State officials have denied out-of-state adoptive parents revised birth
certificates, which recognize their status as legal parents in their child’s
birth state, because the parents would be statutorily unable to adopt in that
state.
Various U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to whether, and to
what extent, the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV of the
Constitution requires that state executive officials recognize out-of-state
rights. Circuits also differ as to whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
confers an individual right for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on parents
alleging a violation of the Clause. The divergent opinions result from
conflicting interpretations of the force and scope of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, distinctions between recognition and enforcement of out-ofstate rights, and the varying views of the Clause’s balance of state policy
interests and federal unity imperatives.
This Note argues that the language, history, and purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause demonstrate that the Clause requires states—
including both judicial and executive officers—to give meaningful
recognition to judicially established rights. It concludes that the denial of
revised birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive couples violates the Full
Faith and Credit Clause’s mandate to meaningfully recognize and equally
enforce out-of-state judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
It is when a clash of policies between two states emerges that the need of
the Clause is the greatest.1

In 2000, Heather Finstuen became a legal mother of two girls after
adopting the biological daughters of her partner in New Jersey.2 The family
moved to Oklahoma soon after the adoption.3 Beginning in 2004, however,
Finstuen began to avoid signing her daughters‘ permission slips for school
field trips, gymnastics, and Girl Scout camp.4 She stopped signing school
enrollment forms and health release forms, even when one daughter had
surgery.5 She and her partner, Anne Magro, feared that Finstuen would be
unable to visit her daughters if one was admitted to intensive care, or be
unable to sign forms in an emergency should Magro be unavailable.6
The family‘s concern arose from a 2004 amendment to Oklahoma‘s
adoption code that prohibited any state official, agency, or court from
recognizing an out-of-state adoption by a same-sex couple.7 To Oklahoma
officials, these out-of-state parent-child relationships did not exist.8
Pursuant to the amendment, state officials began refusing to issue revised
1. United Nat‘l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 42 (1949).
2. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.
2007).
3. Id.
4. See id.; Brief for Appellees at 9, Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139 (No. 06-6213), 2006 WL
3381195.
5. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Id.
7. See Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1300, 1302.
8. See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 9.
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birth certificates for the children of same-sex couples who presented out-ofstate adoption decrees.9 Without these birth certificates, same-sex couples
were unable to prove their parent-child relationships.10
Once an obscure provision termed the ―lawyer‘s clause‖ of the
Constitution,11 the Full Faith and Credit Clause is now at the center of a
nationwide debate involving parents, children, adoption, and same-sex
marriage.12 Circuit courts have split regarding the force and scope of the
Clause. In Finstuen v. Crutcher,13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that the Oklahoma adoption code amendment violated the
Clause by categorically prohibiting recognition of out-of-state adoption
decrees held by same-sex couples.14 In so holding, the Tenth Circuit
allowed the plaintiffs to bring a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
the deprivation of constitutional rights by a state executive official.15
Five years later, in Adar v. Smith,16 the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana
policy of denying revised birth certificates to same-sex out-of-state couples
did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.17 The Fifth Circuit also
held that the Clause governed only state courts, rather than state officials,
and that plaintiffs had no federal cause of action under § 1983 for alleged
violations of the Clause.18 This circuit split reflects the current climate in
the United States of ―volatile uncertainty regarding the portability of
parental rights acquired by same-sex or unmarried couples and other
alternative families from state to state.‖19
This Note explains the legal conflict surrounding a state‘s obligation
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize out-of-state adoption
judgments held by certain groups or individuals, and whether that
obligation confers an individual right enforceable under § 1983. Part I of
this Note explores the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
policies and law underlying American adoption practice, and the protection
of constitutional rights under § 1983. Part II analyzes the split among
courts over whether out-of-state adoptive couples are entitled to receive
revised birth certificates recognizing their status as legal parents in their
child‘s birth state, when the couple would be unable to adopt in that state.
9. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2007).
10. Id. at 1145.
11. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution,
45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945).
12. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Illinois Bishops Drop Program over Bias Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A16 (discussing a controversy regarding a new Illinois law
requiring Catholic Charities to consider same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents in
order to receive state funding); Mark Landler, Obama Still Lets Surrogates Take the Lead as
Gay Rights Momentum Builds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A11.
13. 496 F.3d 1139.
14. Id. at 1156.
15. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Finstuen v. Edmondson,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No. 04CV1152), 2004 WL 3139176.
16. 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 156–57.
19. 1 KAREN MOUDLING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1:26 (West 2012).
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In Part III, this Note proposes a framework of ―meaningful recognition‖ to
describe the Clause‘s mandate concerning judicially established rights. It
asserts that this obligation binds both state judicial and executive officers.
The Note concludes that the denial of revised birth certificates to out-ofstate adoptive couples violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s command
to meaningfully recognize and equally enforce out-of-state judgments.
I. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL ISSUES
This Note first explores the three legal fields that have converged in the
current circuit split. Part I.A explains how the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires states to recognize—to varying degrees—legal rights and
obligations created in sister states. Part I.B describes state adoption practice
with a focus on same-sex couples‘ access to adoption. Part I.C considers
the vindication of constitutional rights under § 1983.
A. The Full Faith and Credit Command:
The Clause, Its History and Purpose
This section examines how the knotty doctrine of full faith and credit
regulates interstate relations and protects rights and obligations that travel
across state lines. Part I.A.1 introduces the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the fundamental issues surrounding its application. Part I.A.2 details
the development of the full faith and credit doctrine, as advanced by the
U.S. Supreme Court. After explaining the principles animating the Clause
in Part I.A.3, Part I.A.4 shows how the Clause‘s underlying principles
determine the different credit due to state records, laws, and judgments.
Part I.A.5 concludes by describing Supreme Court precedent that has
addressed the scope of the Clause.
1. Primer on a Problematic Clause
Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution commands that ―Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.‖20 At its core, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause addresses what a state should do when presented with a sister-state
law or judgment. In doing so, it ―serves to coordinate the administration of
justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our
Federation.‖21

20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
sometimes referred to as the ―Effects Clause.‖ See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 257 (1998). For clarity, this Note will refer to the first sentence as
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and to the second sentence as the Effects Clause.
21. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 2.
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It is uncontested that the terms ―faith‖ and ―credit‖ derive from the
English law of evidence22 and that the doctrine generally developed from
the law of nations.23 It is also clear that the Clause does not mean that one
state‘s judgment holds the same force in a second state as a judgment
rendered by that second state.24 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
literal enforcement of the Clause can lead to ―absurd‖ results.25 Thus,
despite its modifier ―full,‖ the Full Faith and Credit Clause is neither
―inexorable [nor] unqualified‖ in its application to records, statutes, and
judgments.26 Scholars have asserted that ―murky‖27 origins and a ―hazy‖28
understanding of this constitutional clause have contributed to its
problematic interpretation.
A fundamental uncertainty has been how to weigh the full faith and
credit due to the various sister-state activities listed in the Clause. Since the
Clause‘s enactment, scholars have debated whether it provides for a narrow,
evidentiary effect, or a broader, preclusive effect.29 Under the narrow
evidentiary approach, out-of-state enactments would be given effect only
insofar as a court must accept them as proof that another state‘s statutes and
judgments exist and ―deal with the matters described in their text.‖30 Their
content could then be impeached or challenged.31
Interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause to contain a broader
provision would demand that states give substantive effect to sister-state
laws and judgments.32 For example, a judgment‘s merits—not just its
existence—would be given conclusive effect so as to preclude a second
state from examining the same issues of the judgment.33 This approach
would oblige states to recognize the rights and obligations created by a

22. See infra note 44.
23. See infra note 41.
24. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (asserting that the
Framers rejected such a proposal at the 1787 Constitutional Convention).
25. Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). For a
discussion on how the Clause has been interpreted to avoid such a result, see infra Part
I.A.2.e.
26. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
27. WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2005).
28. Jackson, supra note 11, at 6.
29. Compare Whitten, supra note 20, at 294 (―[F]rom English law through the
ratification of the Constitution, the evidence is compelling that the first
sentence . . . [contained commands] merely to admit [judgments of other states] into
evidence as ‗full‘ proof of their own existence and contents . . . .‖), with REYNOLDS &
RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the Clause at the time of ratification as ―giving
the judgments of each state preclusive effect‖), and Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 290 (1992) (asserting that ―the Full Faith and Credit Clause has always been
understood‖ to mean that ―[i]f the first court had jurisdiction, its judgment is binding on all
other states‖).
30. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 257, 263–64.
31. Id. at 263–64.
32. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13.
33. See id.
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sister-state‘s judgment.34 Such a firm mandate would also, in theory,
require states to substitute another state‘s statutory or common law for their
own when the two laws conflict.35 And yet, such a requirement would be,
in the Supreme Court‘s language, ―absurd.‖36
Defining the substantive effect entitled to a sister-state‘s laws
complicated the Clause‘s earliest interpretation.37 A group of scholars has
recently asserted that the modern full faith and credit doctrine has
significantly diverged from what the Framers intended.38 The sections
below provide further detail on the administration of full faith and credit.
2. Origins and Interpretation
This section discusses the origins of the full faith and credit doctrine and
the judicial development of the American approach to full faith and credit.
It considers how the same command came to require different levels of
credit for laws and judgments. This section also explains how both the
absence of codified choice-of-law rules to address conflicting state laws,39
and the addition of a federal full faith and credit implementing statute,40 led
to initial uncertainty over the extent of a state‘s obligation under the Clause
to give effect to out-of-state laws and judgments.
a. The Law of Nations and English Full Faith and Credit
The full faith and credit doctrine speaks to situations in which a state is
presented with a ―foreign‖ (out-of-state) law or judgment. The doctrine has
its origins in principles of the law of nations.41 Generally, the laws of one
34. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
35. See Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
36. Id.
37. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 345 (asserting that judges interpreting the full faith
and credit command between 1790 and 1813 considered its application to public acts to be
―a large obstacle to a broad interpretation . . . of the Clause‖); infra Part I.A.2.
38. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J.
1584, 1586–92 (2009) (arguing that the classic full faith and credit rule, concerning
evidentiary sufficiency, has been obscured and forgotten because of judicial error and
insufficient critical commentary); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early
Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1278–79 (2009) (contending that the Clause contained only
an evidentiary framework, and that ―[o]ver the past 200 years, courts have made ever more
of the spirit of the Clause and of its implementing statute, but in doing so they have rendered
the doctrine less and less coherent‖); Whitten, supra note 20, at 257 (―[M]odern Supreme
Court decisions have . . . gone far beyond the original understanding of the
provision . . . [and] there is little chance that the Supreme Court will revise its current
interpretation of the Clause to return to the original meaning . . . .‖).
39. See infra Part I.A.2.e.
40. See infra Part I.A.2.c.
41. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723–24 n.1 (1988) (observing that
the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was ―properly derived from
[international conflicts law]‖); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE
J. INT‘L L. 1, 51–55 (2006) (drawing on nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century full
faith and credit cases to conclude that the Supreme Court has turned to international law as a
source of authority when interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause). But see infra notes
42, 91–93 and accompanying text for examples of how the Full Faith and Credit Clause
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nation are not binding in the territory of another nation; thus, any effect
given to foreign laws and judgments is a gesture of comity. 42 Accordingly,
nations treat foreign judgments only as prima facie evidence of the
underlying claim, the merits of which could be reexamined by the second
nation.43
Scholars agree that the Constitution‘s phrase ―full faith and credit‖
derives from the English law of evidence.44 The term‘s usage by English
courts, however, was ―ambiguous‖45 or, more positively, ―highly
flexible.‖46 To accord full faith and credit could mean authenticating an
affidavit,47 deeming a record trustworthy,48 or giving prior proceedings
preclusive effect.49 Significantly, English courts treated prior domestic
records and foreign records differently.50 By the eighteenth century,
foreign judgments were given only evidentiary credit, while domestic
judgments from different courts could be entitled to substantive credit
depending on the type or authority of the rendering court.51
b. From Colonial Clauses to Constitution
For the colonies, the two-fold English treatment raised the question of
whether sister-colony judgments should be treated as foreign or domestic.52
Eighteenth century colonial laws varied between granting evidentiary or
substantive effect to neighboring colonies‘ judgments or records.53 Thus,
the drafters of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 faced a diversity of
approaches to full faith and credit.54
differs from the law-of-nations approach. The law of nations is a set of natural law rules that
governs peacetime relations among nations, and addresses traditionally domestic legal issues
such as contract, property, tort, and crime. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*66–68.
42. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (distinguishing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause from the ―general principle of international law by which local policy [was]
permitted to dominate rules of comity‖). Comity, one nation‘s recognition of another
nation‘s legislative, executive, or judicial acts, is ―neither a matter of absolute [legal]
obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will‖ but derives from a nation‘s regard to
―international duty and convenience‖ and ―to the rights of . . . persons who are under the
protection of its laws.‖ Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
43. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 181.
44. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 38, at 1217–19; Whitten, supra note 20, at 269–73.
While one scholar has suggested that the Clause‘s term ―faith‖ implies ―good faith,‖ another
has dismissed this interpretation and argued that the historical evidence ―indicates that it was
understood to mean ‗trust.‘‖ Compare Laycock, supra note 29, at 296, with Whitten, supra
note 20, at 351.
45. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1218.
46. Whitten, supra note 20, at 267.
47. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1218–19.
48. Id. at 1219.
49. Whitten, supra note 20, at 267.
50. Id. at 269–71.
51. Engdahl, supra 38, at 1599–1600; Sachs, supra note 38, at 1219.
52. Engdahl, supra 38, at 1607; Whitten, supra note 20, at 271.
53. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 274–80 (describing full faith and credit acts from
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and South Carolina).
54. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1223; Whitten, supra note 20, at 281.
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The Articles of Confederation contained a full faith and credit clause
identical to that in the Constitution but did not contain an Effects Clause.55
The five reported cases decided under the Articles‘ full faith and credit
provision suggest an evidentiary approach but do not constitute conclusive
evidence about how early courts understood the force of full faith and
credit.56 The cases indicate that courts were concerned about defining
what, if any, substantive effect was entitled to sister-state judgments and
laws.57
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 retained the Articles‘ full faith
and credit command but added the Effects Clause58 in response to
objections that ―if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the
provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among
all Independent Nations.‖59 The Effects Clause allows Congress to provide
the manner of authentication and declare the effect of state public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings.60 The draft text, however, granted
discretion to the states on whether to accord faith and credit, and mandated
the federal government to prescribe the interstate effects of judgments.61
The Convention eventually adopted James Madison‘s suggestion to switch
the verbs ―ought‖ and ―shall‖ so that the Clause‘s charge was binding on
states and the power to promulgate effects of the Clause was within
Congress‘s discretion.62 Consequently, the Full Faith and Credit Clause

55. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3 (―Full faith and credit shall be
given in each of these States to records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and
magistrates of every other State.‖). No surviving document describes how the clause came
to be included in the Articles. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1607.
56. Compare Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1618 (asserting that, taken together, the
decisions indicate that courts gave evidentiary, but not binding, effect to sister-state
judgments), with Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts:
A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 53 (1957) (―These few decisions
are insufficient to support any specific construction of the Full Faith and Credit clause in the
Articles.‖). James Madison described the Articles‘ provision as ―extremely indeterminate‖
and ―of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear.‖ THE FEDERALIST NO.
42, at 221 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
57. See Engdahl, supra 38, at 1614–19 (describing cases); Whitten, supra note 20, at
281–88 (same).
58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., 1986)
(quoting James Wilson); see Whitten, supra note 20, at 376.
60. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 5–6.
61. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 564–65 (1937).
62. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 59, at 489; Daniel
A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the ―Effects Clause‖ of Article IV, Section 1 and
Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 323 (1998).
Madison praised the final constitutional provision as ―an evident and valuable improvement‖
over the Articles of Confederation, and described Congress‘s Effects Clause power as ―a
very convenient instrument of justice.‖ See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 56, at 221–
22 (James Madison).
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became mandatory for states,63 while the Effects Clause permitted the
federal government to modify states‘ compliance at its discretion.64
c. The Full Faith and Credit Statute
Congress soon exercised its Effects Clause power by passing a full faith
and credit act in 1790 (Full Faith and Credit Act).65 In addition to
prescribing specific modes of authentication, the Act required that ―records
and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.‖66
Because the Act varied from the Clause in scope67 but echoed the Clause‘s
63. In other words, the Clause, its effect notwithstanding, was self-executing. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 29, at 292; Sachs, supra note 38, at 1229.
64. See Crane, supra note 62, at 315, 323. The passage of the Defense of Marriage Act,
1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), ignited vigorous debate over the extent of
congressional power under the Effects Clause; this Note can only briefly summarize the
controversy in the context of full faith and credit. According to one theory, Congress can
constitutionally legislate to augment the faith and credit mandate but cannot authorize
anything less than ―full‖ faith and credit. See, e.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB.
L. REV. 604, 635–39 (1997) (comparing this ―Ratchet Theory‖ to the one-way ratchet theory
considered in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
suggested that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to strengthen
but not narrow Fourteenth Amendment rights); James M. Patten, The Defense of Marriage
Act: How Congress Said ―No‖ to Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 939, 952–57 (1998) (arguing that Congress has no power to enact legislation
that limits the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because such legislation reduces the
Clause to ―surplusage‖); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit,
and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 44 (2005) (contending that to
decrease the required effect of state statutes and judgments would ―repeal part of the
Constitution‖). The opposing theory asserts that the Effects Clause permits Congress to
excuse recognition of out-of-state marriage, thus contracting the full faith and credit
command. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26–27 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930–31 (―Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such
exceptions as it deems appropriate.‖); Lynn D. Wardle, Non-recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 391–
419 (2005) (arguing that the Effects Clause grants qualified power to Congress to prescribe
the effect of sister-state activities because it is the ―branch of government best suited to make
the decision about conflicting state policy interests‖). The Supreme Court has not ruled on
this matter, but once observed:
[W]hile Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit
that a State must accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least
some question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit
required by a decision of this Court.
Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980).
65. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (2006)). This act is often called the ―implementing statute.‖ E.g., Baker v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments: A Summary View of the Situation in the United
States, 4 INT‘L LAW. 720, 722 n.10 (1970).
66. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11.
67. The Act‘s language varies from the Clause‘s text in several ways. First, the Act is
silent as to the interstate effect of laws (public acts). Second, whereas the Clause mandates
that full faith and credit be given ―in each State,‖ the Act limits its prescribed effect to
courts. Third, the Act also limits its scope to judicial records. Fourth, the Act extends the
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faith and credit language, judges interpreting the Act were required to
address whether Congress was importing the Clause‘s command or
dictating a different effect.68 As with the faith and credit provision in the
Articles of Confederation, the lower court decisions included both
evidentiary and substantive interpretations of the term ―full faith and
credit.‖69 A second implementing statute, enacted in 1804 to cover
executive records,70 did little to resolve the uncertainty.71 Eventually, the
Supreme Court addressed the divergent interpretations in its first full faith
and credit case in 1813.
d. The Supreme Court Resolves Credit Owed to Judgments
In Mills v. Duryee,72 the Supreme Court ruled that the Full Faith and
Credit Act prescribed a substantive effect for records and judgments so as
to preclude the reexamination of merits.73 Mills concerned an action of
debt brought in the District of Columbia on a New York judgment, and
addressed the question whether the defendant could enter a plea denying the
existence of the debt.74 The Supreme Court, therefore, had to resolve
whether the prior New York judgment should be introduced into the D.C.
court as merely rebuttable evidence of debt, or given substantive effect.75
Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Story explained that interpreting
the Act to contain a mere evidentiary rule would render the constitutional
Clause ―illusory.‖76 Mills clarified that the judgment of a state court must
have the same ―credit, validity and effect‖ in other states as it had in the

faith and credit obligation to all courts, thus including federal courts. Fifth, though using the
Clause‘s phrase ―faith and credit,‖ the Act does not specify ―full faith and credit‖ but
employs the comparative expression ―such faith and credit . . . as‖ the record or judgment
had where rendered. The current statute, as amended in 1948, requires full faith and credit to
sister-state statutes, and expands its coverage to federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006)
(―Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.‖).
68. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1588, 1640–47 (surveying cases and arguing that the
Clause contained an evidentiary sufficiency rule and the Act prescribed substantive effect);
Whitten, supra note 20, at 296–327 (analyzing cases and concluding that a ―clear majority‖
of judges rejected a broad reading of both the Clause and Act).
69. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1640–47; Whitten, supra note 20, at 296–327; supra
notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
70. See Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 298 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (2006))
(providing all ―records [once authenticated] . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court and office within the United States . . . as they have . . . in the courts or offices of
the State . . . from which they are taken.‖).
71. See Sachs, supra note 38, at 1246–48.
72. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
73. Id. at 483.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 484.
76. Id. at 485. Reynolds and Richman note that Justice Story‘s ―emphatic rejection‖ of
an evidentiary interpretation of the Act was ―heightened‖ by the fact that it was issued over a
dissent, ―a rare event in those days.‖ REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 9.
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rendering state.77 In Mills, therefore, the substance of the prior New York
judgment could not be revisited or impeached in a second state.78 Justice
Story attributed the substantive effect to the Act and did not directly address
the Clause‘s force.79
Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the effect given to
sister-state judgments was attributed to both the Clause and Act without
regard to the provisions‘ differing language.80 Thus, in 1887‘s Chicago &
Alton Railroad Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,81 the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that ―[w]ithout doubt‖ the Clause by itself meant that even statutes
―shall be given the same effect by the courts of another state that they have
by law and usage at home.‖82
e. The Clause and Choice of Law
As noted above, the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally governs the
force with which a state judgment or law travels across state lines.83 The
Clause does not, however, specify what happens where one state court is
faced with another state‘s conflicting statutory or common law.84 The
Clause‘s silence as to choice-of-law rules has been a thorny issue in full
faith and credit doctrine for state legislative acts.85 This Note briefly
summarizes the issue.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court experimented
with and abandoned an application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that
involved appraising states‘ competing interests to determine which state law
to apply in a dispute.86 Under this balancing approach, ―[p]rima facie every
state [was] entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,‖ unless one
of the parties showed ―that of the conflicting interests involved those of the
foreign state [were] superior to those of the forum.‖ 87 This method

77. See Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 234 (1818) (summarizing
Mills‘s holding).
78. Mills, 11 U.S. at 483.
79. Id. at 485.
80. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1588 (―By the last quarter of the nineteenth
century . . . habituation to the longstanding replication rule prescribed by the 1790 Act had
induced the impression that [the Clause‘s phrase ―full faith and credit‖] by itself imported
sister-state replication of effect [for judgments from other forums].‖).
81. 119 U.S. 615 (1887).
82. Id. at 622.
83. See supra Part I.A.1.
84. For a summary of modern full faith and credit doctrine regarding state laws, see
infra Part I.A.4.b.
85. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 19–43 (providing an overview of
the ―public acts‖ provision‘s ―long and checkered history‖); Jackson, supra note 11, at 6–7
(concluding that the Framers did not ―anticipate the refinements and distinctions that have
been developed by later experience and now find place in that peculiarly American body of
scholarship and controversy known as ‗Conflict of Laws‘‖).
86. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495 (2003) (describing this line of
cases).
87. Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935).
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suggested that a state would not have to apply sister-state law that it found
―obnoxious to its policy.‖88
Having discarded this balancing approach, the Supreme Court‘s
application of full faith and credit now allows a state to choose its own law
as long as it ―ha[s] a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.‖89 In this way, the evolving application
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to statutes has merged with the Due
Process Clause to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a state‘s choice
of law in its courts.90
3. Purpose and Principles
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is an essential tool for welding the
states into a unified and integrated country.91 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared that the Clause‘s animating purpose was ―to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to
ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of
the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation.‖92 To
achieve the change from foreign sovereigns to united states, the Framers
―substituted [the Clause‘s] command for the earlier principles of comity.‖93
As a result, the Full Faith and Credit Clause prevents states from
discriminating against other states and refusing to enforce validly created
rights and obligations.94
When the Clause restricts one state‘s authority, however, it concurrently
promotes state sovereignty by preserving the policies encompassed in

88. Pac. Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939). For
discussion on the ―public policy‖ exception to full faith and credit due to statutes, see infra
notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
89. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981).
90. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 19.
91. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 289 (1980) (White, J.,
concurring) (―[T]he major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to act as a
nationally unifying force.‖); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951) (―[T]he
Framers intended [the Clause] to help weld the independent states into a nation . . . .‖);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (describing the Clause as ―a
nationally unifying force‖ similar to the Commerce Clause).
92. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1935); see, e.g., Baker
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.9
(1951); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942).
93. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). For a definition of comity, see supra note
42.
94. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611 (―It is also settled that [a state] cannot escape [its]
constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of
other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise
competent.‖); Estin, 334 U.S. at 546–47 (―The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to be
applied, accordion-like, to accommodate [a court‘s] personal predilections.‖); Milwaukee
Cnty., 296 U.S. at 276–77 (interpreting the Clause to prevent states from ignoring legal
obligations created by other states); cf. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2125–26 n.5
(2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Clause is a ―textual prohibition‖ on ―stateto-state discrimination‖).
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another state‘s judicial determination, law, or record.95 The Supreme Court
has observed that the Clause prevents ―parochial entrenchment on the
interests of other States‖ that would occur if the rendering state could
dictate an external effect other than full faith and credit.96 The Clause
promotes interstate compromise by allowing a state to determine the
extraterritorial effects of its laws, but only ―indirectly, by prescribing the
effect of its judgments within‖ its own territory.97
In addition to balancing state interests in securing and defending policies,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges states to respect judicial finality.98
The Clause limits a state legislature‘s ability to undermine the enforcement
of obligations created by sister-state judiciaries.99 Similarly, the Clause
prohibits state executive officers from substituting their judgment for the
policies underlying a sister-state‘s judicial determination.100 Though the
Full Faith and Credit Clause allows state legislatures to direct the
enforcement of rights and obligations resulting from out-of-state judgments,
the Clause ensures that states treat the judgments with equal dignity,
regardless of the conflicting policies.101
The Supreme Court has also articulated that the Clause benefits
individual litigants by preserving their rights acquired or confirmed under a
state‘s validly created law or judgment.102 The Clause advances the
―maximum enforcement‖ of state obligations or rights in sister-states.103
95. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 34 (asserting that the Clause promotes a system of
justice ―based on the preservation but better integration‖ of state jurisdictions); Mark D.
Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full
Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 935 (2006) (―Case law makes clear . . . that the Clause aims
not only at unifying the states, but also at ensuring that the states remain meaningfully
empowered, distinct polities.‖).
96. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 272.
97. Id. at 270; cf. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 10 (asserting that the Clause
minimizes interstate friction).
98. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (stating that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a state to ―treat a state-court judgment with the same
respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering State‖); REYNOLDS & RICHMAN,
supra note 27, at 10 (asserting that the Clause requires states to ―trust the integrity of the
activities of other states‖).
99. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
Oklahoma statute that categorically denied the ―effective operation‖ of a class of sister-state
judgments violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause); infra Part II.A.2.
100. See Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (Va. 2005) (invalidating a state
registrar‘s interpretation of a statute providing for the recognition of out-of-state adoption
decrees to exclude adoptions by same-sex couples because ―[j]ust as we cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the [Virginia] General Assembly, neither can an agency of the
executive branch of government‖). But see Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (upholding a state registrar‘s interpretation of a
statute directing the recognition of out-of-state adoption decrees to exclude adoptions by
same-sex couples without addressing the registrar‘s power to do so).
101. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (explaining that a state‘s
obligation to recognize sister-state judgments is ―exacting‖ and lacks any ―public policy
exception‖).
102. See, e.g., Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941); Pac.
Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
103. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
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By preserving the finality of judgments, the Clause protects individual
liberty and allows individuals to travel through states with the security that
judicially created rights enjoy ―nation-wide application.‖104 Moreover, a
state‘s full faith and credit duty promotes finality and certainty for
individuals by preventing dissatisfied litigants from relitigating issues that
have already been decided in another state.105 The Clause protects parties
from the ―uncertainty, confusion, and delay‖ that accompany such
reexamination.106
In sum, the Full Faith and Credit Clause carefully balances four
competing interests: (1) the interest of federalism in state compromise; (2)
dual state interests in promoting state policies and defending against the
intrusion of other state‘s policies; (3) the interest of separation of powers in
preserving judgments; and (4) the interests of individuals in liberty and
security.107 The different credit due to sister-state laws or judgments
reflects the Clause‘s cautious balance.108 Scholars debate when the Clause
may recognize that a single state‘s interest in preserving its own policies—
and declining the policies encompassed by an out-of-state judgment—is
outweighed by the competing federal, state, and individual interests.109 In
such cases, the Clause may ―order submission by one State even to hostile
policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical
operation of the federal system . . . demand[s] it.‖110 Thus, a state‘s full
faith and credit obligation is the ―price‖ of a unified federal system.111
4. Modern Doctrine: How to Measure Full Faith and Credit
In effecting the principles discussed above, contemporary Supreme Court
decisions have clarified that the demand of full faith and credit adjusts
depending on the type of law rendered. Building on the history and
principles outlined above, this section details the modern doctrine of full
faith and credit.
104. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); see Courtney G. Joslin,
Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV.
L. & POL‘Y REV. 31, 39–40 (2010).
105. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958).
106. Underwriters Nat‘l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar.
Ass‘n, 455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982).
107. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother? Interstate Recognition of
Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (identifying the tension
between family, state, and federal interests).
108. See infra Part I.A.4.b–c.
109. Compare Wasserman, supra note 107, at 82 (concluding that state, federal, and—
especially in the adoption context—a child‘s ―overriding interest in stable family
relationships,‖ outweigh a single state‘s interest in denying recognition or enforcement to
out-of-state adoption decrees), with Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate
Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 598–99 (2005) (concluding
that a state may decline to recognize or enforce incidental rights of sister-state adoption
judgments that violate a strong, conflicting policy of the state).
110. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
111. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (―If in [the Clause‘s] application
local policy must at times be required to give way, such ‗is the part of the price of our federal
system.‘‖ (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942))).
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a. Records and Routine Admission
Case law and commentary are sparse on the full faith and credit
doctrine‘s application to records.112 ―Records‖ in the Clause refer to
nonjudicial records.113 The two implementing statutes provide simple
procedures for authenticating records for admission into evidence,114 which
courts have followed without controversy.115 The ―records‖ provisions of
the Clause and its companion acts have not been applied beyond this
effect.116 Generally, to give full faith and credit to sister-state records
means to ―admit them routinely‖ into evidence in court.117
b. Public Acts and the Public Policy Exception
A state‘s compliance with the full faith and credit command when asked
to apply another state‘s ―public acts‖ is more complex.118 It is well
established that a state‘s statutes constitute ―public acts‖ under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.119 For choice-of-law purposes, the Supreme Court
has articulated that the Clause operates along with the Due Process Clause
to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a forum state‘s authority to
apply its own law in a dispute between diverse parties.120
With an accommodating standard,121 the Clause does not require ―a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.‖122 Although
by the 1950s the Supreme Court had abandoned the notion that a court
should weigh conflicting state interests,123 it has reiterated that a court may
be ―guided by the forum State‘s ‗public policy‘ in determining the law
applicable to a controversy.‖124 As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court

112. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13–18.
113. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 294.
114. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
115. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13–14 (observing that the ―absence of
controversy‖ about the application of full faith and credit to records ―reveals how well the
system [for records] works in practice‖).
116. See id. at 13–18. But see Shawn Gebhardt, Comment, Full Faith and Credit for
Status Records: A Reconsideration of Gardiner, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1419, 1422–25 (2009)
(arguing that personal status records issued by administrative agencies should be accorded
the same faith and credit as judgments).
117. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13.
118. See supra Part I.A.2.e.
119. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1932) (―That a statute is
a ‗public act‘ within the meaning of [the Clause] is settled.‖).
120. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
121. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942).
122. Pac. Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); accord
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003).
123. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981); Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408, 413 (1955).
124. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979)).
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alluded to the Clause‘s public policy exception with respect to applying
sister-state statutes.125
c. Judgments and the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
The full faith and credit command is most demanding with respect to
judicial proceedings.126 In contrast to the accommodating statutory
approach, an ―exacting‖ obligation denies states any discretion in choosing
to recognize sister-state judgments.127 Simply put, there is ―no roving
‗public policy exception‘‖ that might permit states to ignore another state‘s
judgment.128 Through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, ―rights judicially
established in any part are given nation-wide application.‖129
Accordingly, sister-state judgments are entitled to nationwide force ―for
claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes.‖130 To qualify for this
fullest treatment, a judgment must be final,131 and rendered by a court with
125. See Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S. at 499 (quoting Carroll, 349 U.S. at 413) (―States‘
sovereignty interests are not foreign to the full faith and credit command. But we are not
presented here with a case in which a State has exhibited a ‗policy of hostility to the public
Acts‘ of a sister State.‖). Some scholars assert that, though the public policy allowance was
part of the law-of-nations approach to conflict of laws, the Clause was intended to eliminate
the exception. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–72, 1985–86 (1997)
(arguing that the public policy exception was ―a matter of customary international law‖ and
had been ―incorporated into American practice with no particular thought given to its
appropriateness in the context of a federal system defined by a written constitution,‖ but that
―[t]he central object of the Clause was . . . to eliminate a state‘s prideful unwillingness to
recognize other states‘ laws or judgments on the ground that these are inferior or
unacceptable‖); Laycock, supra note 29, at 313 (―The public-policy exception is a relic
carried over from international law without reflection on the changes in interstate relations
wrought by the Constitution.‖).
126. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 71–74; William L. Reynolds, The
Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 412–14 (1994).
127. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
128. Id.
129. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
130. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. The Supreme Court first articulated this comparison in
1942. See Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942) (―By the Constitutional
provision for full faith and credit, the local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally,
[became] a part of national jurisprudence.‖). American res judicata doctrine is an almost
entirely judge-made body of law governing both the issue and claim preclusive effects of
judgment. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 5, 9 (2001). Issue preclusion refers to the bar on
relitigation of matters actually litigated and determined. Id. at 11. Claim preclusion refers to
a judgment‘s extinguishing of claims presented for adjudication, whether or not all matters
within the claim were litigated in the action. Id.
131. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. For purposes of full res judicata effect (both issue and claim
preclusion), ―[a] judgment is final when all the issues on which it turns have been decided‖
and ―the trial court has concluded the regular proceedings in adjudicating the claim.‖ CASAD
& CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 51–52. Even judgments that control future activity and
may be subject to modification, such as custody determinations, are ―sufficiently final‖ for
res judicata purposes because any change in circumstances that might allow modification
would create different claims and issues. Id. at 51. Nevertheless, because of uncertainty
among courts as to whether custody determinations qualified as ―final judgments‖ for
purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress exercised its Effects Clause authority
with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) of 1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94
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both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.132 Although each jurisdiction
independently generates its own distinctive res judicata body of law,133 the
extent of a judgment‘s preclusive effect in a sister state is defined by the
rendering state.134
Similarly, because a state may not dictate the extraterritorial effect of its
judgment beyond what the state provides within its borders,135
―[e]nforcement measures do not travel‖ with the judgment.136 Enforcement
measures broadly encompass state practices ―regarding the time, manner,
and mechanisms for enforcing judgments‖137 and include statutes of
limitations, execution procedures, garnishment availability, and provisions
governing property interests and creditor prioritizing for debtor
judgments.138 Accordingly, an enforcing state may refuse an order that
―purport[s] to accomplish an official act within [its] exclusive province.‖139
Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause grants a state control over its
enforcement mechanisms, the Clause requires that the state apply them in
an ―evenhanded‖ manner.140 The enforcing state may not, for example,
―under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of
claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause‖
when those claims were validly rendered.141
5. Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Thompson v. Thompson
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is most commonly invoked by litigants
after one court refuses to substantively recognize the laws or judgments of
another state.142 In Thompson v. Thompson,143 the Supreme Court
Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)); infra note 149 and accompanying text.
The PKPA requires that the ―appropriate authorities‖ of every state ―shall enforce . . . and
shall not modify‖ sister-state custody or visitation determinations, except under certain
enumerated circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a).
132. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233; see also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 49–50
(identifying this res judicata requirement as ―validity,‖ which requires valid subject-matter
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, and adequate notice).
133. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 5.
134. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908); supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
136. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (citing McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
312, 323 (1839)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971) (―The
local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is
enforced.‖).
137. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
138. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 72.
139. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
140. Id.
141. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (citing Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 290, 300 (1866)); see also Philadelphia v. Bauer, 478 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J. 1984)
(―‗The legislature cannot accomplish indirectly that which it could not do directly.‘‖
(quoting Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 463 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 1983))). The Bauer court
continued, ―A state may not by subterfuge refuse to give full faith and credit to the judgment
of a sister state.‖ Id. at 777.
142. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 154 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
400 (2011); Brief for Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the
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addressed whether the Clause provided a private federal cause of action to
―enforce‖ the Clause when two conflicting state orders existed, but neither
state court had denied recognition to the other‘s order.144
In Thompson, a father brought suit in federal court against his ex-wife,
and sought an order declaring the validity of a Louisiana order that had
granted him custody of their child, while invalidating a California custody
order in favor of his wife.145 The plaintiff did not allege a violation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause because he had not challenged the California
order in state court prior to initiating the case in federal court.146 Instead,
he based the action against his wife on a full faith and credit provision in
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act147 (PKPA).
The Thompson court ruled that the PKPA‘s full faith and credit reference
did not provide an implied private cause of action in federal court to
determine which of two conflicting custody orders should prevail.148 In the
Court‘s words, the purpose of the PKPA was to increase a state court‘s full
faith and credit obligation owed to custody orders, whose status as ―final
judgments‖ was in doubt because they were modifiable.149 The Supreme
Court found that Congress intended the PKPA to have the ―same operative
effect‖ as the Full Faith and Credit Act.150 The Court reasoned that the
PKPA was ―most naturally construed‖ as a ―mandate directed to state
courts‖ and therefore, did not ―create an entirely new cause of action‖
beyond challenging a state court‘s denial of full faith and credit.151
In its analysis, the Thompson court observed that ―the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does not
give rise to an implied federal cause of action.‖152 The Court, citing 1904‘s
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., noted that the Clause ―only
prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided‖ when
deciding the effect and applicability of sister-state laws or statutes.153
Expressing concern that federal review to enjoin a state custody order
would require inquiry into states‘ substantive domestic relationship
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Adar, No. 11-46 (U.S. July 11, 2011), 2011 WL
3584748, at *11.
143. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
144. Id. at 179–80.
145. Id. at 178–79.
146. Id. at 178.
147. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)); see supra
note 131.
148. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179–80.
149. See id. at 180–82 (―[T]he principal problem Congress was seeking to remedy was
the inapplicability of full faith and credit requirements to custody determinations.‖).
150. Id. at 183.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 182 (citing Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904)). In Minnesota v.
Northern Securities Co., Minnesota argued that a question of according full faith and credit
to its laws was grounds for removal to federal court where the state alleged that Northern
Securities had violated state antitrust law. 194 U.S. 48, 71–72 (1904). The Supreme Court
dismissed this argument as irrelevant and observed that ―the clause has nothing to do with
the conduct of individuals or corporations.‖ Id. at 72.
153. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182–83 (citing Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. at 72).
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determinations, the Supreme Court also found that Congress did not intend
to involve the federal courts in the enforcement of state custody orders.154
It dismissed the suggestion that federal review was necessary because state
courts were ―unable or unwilling‖ to give full faith and credit to sister-state
custody determinations.155 Accordingly, the Thompson court concluded
that the full faith and credit mandate encompassed in the PKPA did not
create a cause of action for an individual against another individual for
federal review of the validity of conflicting state custody decrees.156
B. The Twenty-First Century Brady Bunch:
Adoption, Legal Parenthood, and Same-Sex Couples
Part I.B presents an overview of the American process of adoption. First,
it explores state and federal law governing adoption practice, with a focus
on state policies that control adoption by gays, lesbians, and same-sex
couples. Next, this section explains the rights and obligations created by
adoption, while providing detail on state statutes that require the issuance of
revised birth certificates following an adoption.
1. The Requirement of Judicial Sanction
Though a ―creature of . . . statutes,‖157 adoption is sealed with a
judgment.158 Since Massachusetts enacted the first modern American
adoption statute in 1851,159 a distinctive feature of American adoption
practice has been the requirement of a judicial finding that the ―best
interests‖ of the child are served.160 Prior to 1851, private transfers effected

154. Id. at 186 n.4. The Supreme Court also noted the ―extraordinary nature‖ of such an
action that would allow federal review of a state trial court‘s decision prior to review by a
state‘s appellate or highest court. Id. at 187 n.5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 1 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02[1] (2008).
There was no common law right to adoption. Id. For a history of adoption from Roman
times, and of the development of American law, see generally Leo Albert Huard, The Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956), and Stephen B. Presser, The
Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971).
158. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][a]–[b].
159. See, e.g., id. § 1.02[2]; id. app. 1-A.
160. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-703(a) cmt., 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994) (―A judicial
determination that a proposed adoption will be in the best interest of the minor adoptee is an
essential—and ultimately the most important—prerequisite to the granting of the
adoption.‖); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042–43 (1979)
(describing the 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute as the first ―modern‖ adoption law and
emphasizing its ―notable‖ feature that ―[t]he heart of the adoption transaction became the
judicially monitored transfer of rights‖). A child‘s ―best interests‖ were defined more in
economic than in psychological terms well into the twentieth century. See 1 HOLLINGER ET
AL., supra note 157, § 1.03[2]. Beginning in the 1930s, the modern view of adoption
emerged, characterized by concern for the social and psychological well-being of the child.
See id. § 1.04.
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adoption in America.161 Adoption was viewed as a contract between adults
to address concerns of inheritance and the continuity of the adopter‘s
family.162
The shift in American adoption law, from private contracts to public
statutes requiring judicial approval, reflected a realization ―of what is
accomplished in the legal act of adopting‖—the endowment to the adopted
child of rights equal to that of a natural child.163 The magnitude of this
result necessitated state involvement to protect the child.164 The modern
approach therefore incorporated an ―expanded [judicial] authority to
employ . . . discretion‖ that already existed for the resolution of custody
disputes.165 In sum, ―the public sector triumphed over the private‖ in
American adoption policy.166
Although an agency or individuals may now ―arrange‖ an adoption,167
the legal relationship of parent and child cannot be created without a
judicial decree.168 A court must determine a biological parent‘s consent (or
waiver) and a child‘s ―best interests‖ before any legal rights or obligations
transfer.169 Despite a common standard of ―best interests,‖ however, state
adoption statutes rarely define the term with specificity.170 As a result of
state legislatures‘ silence, courts hold broad authority in evaluating and
finalizing adoptions.171
2. Judicial Adoption Procedures and Determining a Child‘s ―Best Interests‖
Both the state legislature and judiciary share in controlling the privilege
to legally adopt,172 with a statute directing who may adopt and how, and a
judge deciding who and what will serve the child‘s ―best interests.‖173
161. See Presser, supra note 157, at 461–64; Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1075–83.
162. See Huard, supra note 157, at 748–49.
163. Presser, supra note 157, at 463–64.
164. Adoption, therefore, involves a state‘s parens patriae interest in ―preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child‖ with the goal of providing a permanent home. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); see also BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed.
2009) (defining parens patriae as, literally, ―parent of the country,‖ and, in application, to
―the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves‖).
165. Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1052, 1085–86.
166. Id. at 1089.
167. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 3.01–4.
168. See id. § 4.03[1]; Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1042–43.
169. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][a]–[b].
170. See id. § 4.01[1]; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a (West Supp.
2011) (listing legislative findings that the best interests of a child in adoption are promoted
―by having persons in the child‘s life who manifest a deep concern for the child‘s growth and
development‖; when ―a child has as many persons loving and caring for the child as
possible‖; and when ―the child is part of a loving, supportive and stable family‖).
171. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1] (noting that ―most adoption
statutes do not include a list of specific factors to be considered in making a best interests
determination‖); see also In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. 1992) (asserting that a court‘s
determination as to the ―best interests‖ of a child must be fact-specific because ―magic
formulas have no place in decisions designed to salvage human values‖ (citing Lemay v.
Lemay, 247 A.2d 189, 191 (N.H. 1968))).
172. See supra Part I.B.1.
173. See supra Part I.B.1.
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Because the term ―best interests‖ lacks any uniform statutory description,174
adoption law reflects diverse state policies regarding domestic relations and
family law.175 In determining whether a particular household promotes a
child‘s ―best interests,‖ the judicial gatekeeper must consider whether the
prospective adopters are suitable.176 Among other factors,177 courts have
accorded weight to an adopter‘s age,178 religion,179 race,180 marital
status,181 and sexual orientation.182 Though state adoption law is diverse
and therefore inconsistent,183 courts commonly articulate the goal of
adoption statutes as providing the child with a loving, stable, and permanent
home.184 Nevertheless, attempts to achieve uniformity among state
adoption law and procedures have largely faltered.185

174. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1].
175. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2003) (prohibiting any homosexual
person from adopting), invalidated by Florida Dep‘t of Children & Families v. Adoption of
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 2010), and G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 983 (Fla. 2008)
(describing the goal of Florida‘s adoption scheme as a ―stable, permanent, and loving
environment‖ for an adopted child), with In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. 1995)
(describing the purpose of the District of Columbia‘s adoption statute as to ―provide a
loving, nurturing home‖ and concluding that a committed, unmarried same-sex couple could
fulfill this purpose).
176. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[1].
177. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 965
(4th ed. 2010) (listing decisions that considered adopter‘s intelligence, undisclosed
pregnancy, or deafness).
178. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[2]. For commentary on the
consideration of this factor, see generally Sara C. Mills, Perpetuating Ageism via Adoption
Standards and Practices, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC‘Y 69 (2011).
179. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[3]. For commentary on the
consideration of this factor, see generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The
Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383
(1989).
180. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[4]. For commentary on the
consideration of this factor, see generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children
Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); RuthArlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, 42 FAM. L.Q. 465 (2008).
181. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[5]. For commentary on the
consideration of this factor, see generally Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and
Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006); Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for
Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. FAM. STUD. 345
(2003).
182. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 177, at 966–72; infra Part I.B.3.
183. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 1.01[1], 4.03[2].
184. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (explaining that Illinois‘s
adoption statute benefits an adoptee ―by providing a home, support, a family unit, and loving
care‖); In re Adoption of K.F., 935 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re
Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)) (reiterating that the purpose of
Indiana‘s adoption statutes is to provide ―stable family units‖ for children).
185. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1] (noting that only six states
adopted the original Uniform Adoption Act, a model code promulgated in 1951 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws); Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 345, 345, 377 (1996)
(describing the process of drafting the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 as ―bitterly divisive‖
and acknowledging that the Act faced immediate ―intense criticism‖ from lobbying groups).
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Though most adoption proceedings are non-adversarial,186 states
generally require that a petitioner file a pleading187 and give notice to
interested parties,188 and that a court hold a hearing189 and issue a judicial
finding approving the adoption.190 When a natural parent contests an
adoption, the procedural requirements are more stringent.191 Similarly,
where the termination of the natural parents‘ rights, if required,192 occurs
prior to or as a consequence of an adoption judgment, the judicial
proceedings may be more vigorous.193 Reflecting a growing trend among
states, the Uniform Adoption Act194 (UAA) requires an evaluation of the
prospective parents for all adoptions, whether placements by individuals or
agencies, that may then be submitted to the court.195 Finally, even where
uncontested, adoptions entail judicial scrutiny and are not automatically
approved.196
3. State and Federal Laws Addressing Access to Adoption
for Gays and Lesbians
One way in which state statutes control access to adoption is by
specifying certain means to create legal parentage. For example, in a joint
or dual petition adoption, both birth parents relinquish their parental rights,
allowing a married couple to jointly assume legal parentage.197 In a
stepparent adoption, the most common in the United States,198 a child is
adopted by her custodial biological parent‘s new spouse.199 A secondparent adoption allows an adult who is not related to a child through
biology or marriage to become a parent without affecting the legal
relationship between the child and existing parent.200 Every procedure
requires a judicial decree to establish the adopter‘s and adoptee‘s legal
rights.201
186. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 40–42.
187. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-109 (2008).
188. See, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.11 (LexisNexis 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9730 (2010).
189. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-8 (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-750
(2008).
190. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.57 (West 2007).
191. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.09.
192. For example, where a stepparent or a same-sex partner is adopting her spouse‘s
child, existing parental rights may not be terminated. See infra notes 199–200 and
accompanying text.
193. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.04[1][a] (noting stricter evidentiary
standards when an adoption entails the involuntary termination of parental rights).
194. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-201, 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994).
195. See id.; 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.05[3][b].
196. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 40 (listing decisions denying uncontested
adoptions).
197. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 56 (defining ―joint adoption‖).
198. Id. at 57.
199. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1].
200. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 57 (noting that second-parent
adoptions are especially used by lesbian and gay adults).
201. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1].
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As of April 2012, sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow
adoption by same-sex couples through joint or second-parent adoptions.202
Some states have passed statutes to expressly permit such adoption, often
abrogating prior decisions.203
In other states, appellate decisions
interpreting opaque state statutes allow adoption by same-sex couples.204
In ten additional states, trial courts have granted second-parent adoptions to
a non-birth partner.205 At least seven states have laws limiting or
prohibiting adoption by homosexual individuals.206
Where families have challenged state laws restricting adoption based on
the Federal Constitution, federal courts have expressed doubt as to whether
a fundamental right to adopt or be adopted exists.207 Although the Eleventh
Circuit rejected an Equal Protection challenge to a Florida statute
prohibiting homosexuals from adopting,208 commentators continue to split
as to whether this type of law violates the Federal Constitution.209 State
appellate courts have concluded that laws barring adoption by homosexuals
violate state constitutions on privacy210 or equal protection211 grounds.

202. See Adoption by LGBT Parents, NAT‘L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS.,
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/2PA_state_list.pdf?docID=3201
(last
updated
March 2012).
203. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d.5)(I) (2011), abrogating In re Adoption
of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. App. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2004),
abrogating In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999).
204. See Adoption by LGBT Parents, supra note 202.
205. See id.
206. See id. (listing various restrictions found in seven states).
207. See, e.g., Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that ―whatever
claim a prospective adoptive parent may have to a child, we are certain that it does not rise to
the level of a fundamental liberty interest‖); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th
Cir. 1990) (―[W]e cannot recognize a ‗fundamental right‘ to adopt a child.‖). Courts
dismissing claims that adoption is a fundamental right often cite Supreme Court dicta
regarding fundamental privacy rights, in which the Court distinguished a foster family from
a natural family by stating that the former ―has its source in state law and contractual
arrangements.‖ Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–47
(1977); see also Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Smith and
rejecting a claim of fundamental right to adoption); Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Smith and stating that no constitutional right to adopt or
to be adopted exists), aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Dep‘t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004).
208. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817–27 (upholding the constitutionality of the Florida statute and
concluding that the legislature ―could have reasonably believed that prohibiting adoption
into homosexual environments would further its interest in placing adoptive children in
homes that will provide them with optimal developmental conditions‖).
209. Compare Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v.
Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 22 (2004) (concluding that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2004), which held that sodomy bans are unconstitutional, ―leaves policy-makers free . . . to
deny adoptions to parties involved in homosexual relationships‖), with Christopher D.
Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services: Florida’s
Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 418–
22 (2005) (concluding that the Florida statute unconstitutionally excluded homosexuals from
the process of adoption based on animus).
210. See Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, --- S.W.3d ---. (holding that
an Arkansas adoption statute that banned cohabiting same-sex couples from adoption
violated an individual‘s fundamental right of privacy afforded by the Arkansas constitution).
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4. The Adoption Decree, ―Incidental‖ Rights of Parent and Child, and Birth
Certificate Amendment Statutes
The judicial sanction of adoption creates a legal relationship of parent
and child that entails legally enforceable obligations.212 Generally, the
adopter promises to support the child, relieves the biological parent of his or
her rights and obligations, and gains full and exclusive parental rights over
the child.213 Most state statutes provide that after an adoption, the child is
treated as if she were the adopter‘s biological offspring.214 Absent ―fraud
or some other fundamental irregularity,‖ an adoption decree is final and
irrevocable.215 For these reasons, most scholars agree that an adoption
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in subsequent litigation.216
In addition to a change in legal status, the child usually gains inheritance
and property rights as provided by the state of the adoption.217 These
―incidents‖218 of adoption—including an adoptee‘s right to her adoptive
parent‘s name or her right to recover damages for the wrongful death of an
adoptive parent—vary from state to state.219
For example, in recognition of the new legal identity acquired by an
adopted child, every state has a statute providing for the reissuance of a
birth certificate following the out-of-state adoption of a child born instate.220 As suggested by the UAA, these statutes generally entitle a family
to a new birth certificate including the name of the adoptive parents upon
211. See Fla. Dep‘t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (striking down a Florida statute prohibiting any homosexual from
adoption as violating the equal protection clause of the Florida constitution).
212. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1]; Presser, supra note 157, at 445
(distinguishing pre-1851 private contractual practice from modern legal adoption in that an
adopted child could ―expect no assistance from the law in enforcing any obligations which
his adopting parents might have toward him‖).
213. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][c]–[f].
214. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-16 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1508
(2009); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (―Adoption . . . is recognized as the legal equivalent of
biological parenthood.‖).
215. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][e].
216. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be
Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-marriage
Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 751, 752–53
(2003) (―[A] valid, final adoption decree rendered in one state establishing a parent-child
relationship between the adoptive parent[s] and the adoptive child[ren] must be recognized
in every other state as equally valid as an adoption decree rendered in that other state.‖);
Wasserman, supra note 107, at 7–10; Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and
Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 841 (2003) (―There is
no question that states must give effect to the valid adoption judgments of other states.‖).
217. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 1.01[1]–[2][c], 12.03[1].
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290, cmt. b (1971).
219. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 75–79 (analyzing the incidental rights resulting
from the change in legal status of each party to adoption).
220. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12 (LexisNexis 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.570 (LexisNexis 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-417 (2011); Elizabeth J. Samuels,
The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records,
53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001) (pointing out that the practice began in the 1930s).
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submission of an authenticated adoption decree.221 States delegate this task
to state registrars,222 clerks of the court,223 or agencies such as the
department of health224 or bureau of vital statistics.225 Almost all states use
gender-neutral and sexuality-neutral language by providing that the names
of adoptive ―person‖ or ―parents‖ may be substituted.226 Nevertheless, in
states where only married couples or single individuals can adopt,227 and
same-sex couples cannot legally marry,228 out-of-state adoptive families
involving same-sex couples have had difficulty in obtaining new birth
certificates.229
Courts and scholars dispute whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
governs the incidents of adoption. One approach asserts that the incidental
rights of adoption fall within an enforcement framework and are therefore
outside the exacting full faith and credit owed to judgments.230 Another
approach asserts that an adoption‘s incidental rights fall within the Clause‘s
mandate of evenhanded enforcement.231 At least one court has declined to
apply full faith and credit analysis to the issuance of revised birth
certificates.
In Davenport v. Little-Bowser, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
state registrar could not refuse to reissue a birth certificate with both names
of an out-of-state adoptive same-sex couple when the relevant statute
referred to only ―adoptive parents‖ and ―intended parents.‖232 Virginia first
argued that other birth certificate regulations referring to ―mother‖ and
221. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-802, 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994).
222. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02.1-05
(Supp. 2011).
223. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.170 (2010).
224. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-20 (West 2008).
225. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-21 (West 2007).
226. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3126
(2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6A (LexisNexis 2011).
227. For example, in Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah. See States with Restrictions on
Adoption or Fostering by LGB People, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
aclu_map1.pdf (last updated February 14, 2012).
228. For example, in Florida, Montana, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See Defining Marriage:
Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT‘L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last
updated February 24, 2012).
229. See, e.g., Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005); see also infra Part
II.
230. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 400 (2011) (concluding that while Louisiana must recognize under the Clause the
preclusive effect of a sister-state adoption judgment granted to a same-sex couple, the
Louisiana statute providing for the reissuance of the adopted child‘s birth certificate was
governed by Louisiana law and, therefore, permitted the exclusion of the couple); Wardle,
supra note 109, at 597–99, 616 (concluding that the Clause ―does not compel states with
strong public policies against lesbigay adoption . . . to recognize or enforce lesbigay
adoption decrees from other states that would effectively require the second state to
legitimate lesbigay adoption and its incidents within its territory‖).
231. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 82 (arguing that ―just as states must recognize
sister-state adoptions regardless of public policy objections, they must afford sister-state
adoptions the same incidents they afford to local adoptions‖).
232. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 370–72; see VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-261 (2003).
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―father‖ supported a restrictive reading of the adoption provision.233 In
addition, Virginia contended that the state restriction of adoption to single
individuals or to married couples sustained its interpretation.234 The
Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a plain reading of the statute
invalidated the state‘s arguments.235 The court declined to address the
plaintiffs‘ full faith and credit claims, concluding, ―The sole issue in this
case is the enforcement of [the Virginia code].‖236
C. The Beneficent Sword: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ―Other‖ Constitutional
Clauses
Part I.C explores when individuals may maintain actions against state
officials for deprivation of constitutional rights, other than traditional civil
rights such as anti-discrimination and equal protection. Part I.C.1
introduces the text and purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part I.C.2 focuses on
how the Supreme Court determines whether a constitutional provision
creates a right that is actionable under § 1983. Since lower courts
considering whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates enforceable
rights for purposes of § 1983 have cited recent Supreme Court analysis,237
this section examines in detail the Court‘s decision that the Dormant
Commerce Clause confers an individual right for purposes of § 1983.
1. The Purpose and Scope of § 1983
Section 1983 allows a private citizen to bring a cause of action for
incursions upon federal constitutional rights under color of state law.238
Congress enacted this beneficent239 statute in 1871 in response to escalating
racial discrimination in the South and, in particular, to address the state and
local officials who refused to enforce existing legal protections.240

233. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371–72.
234. Id. at 372.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 173–75 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
239. See Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (Section 1983 must be
―liberally and beneficently construed‖ (quoting Congressman Samuel Shellabarger, who
introduced the original act into the 42nd Congress in 1871)).
240. Section 1983 derives from Section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, Act of April 20,
1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 171–73 (1961) (describing the origins of § 1983).
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The statute was a part of the ―profound revolution in federalism‖ 241 that
―alter[ed] the relationship between the States and the Nation.‖242 Section
1983 focuses on vigilante state officers who abused their ―badge of
authority‖ to deprive victims of protected rights.243 The ―very purpose‖ of
§ 1983 was ―to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians‖ of constitutional rights, and to protect individuals
from unconstitutional state action, ―‗whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial.‘‖244 Recognizing the ―paramount role Congress has
assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights,‖ there is no
requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies under § 1983.245
Although it ―lay virtually dormant‖ from the 1890s to the 1940s,246
§ 1983 is now a ―sword‖247 and the primary vehicle for vindicating
constitutional rights against violations by state actors.248 The Supreme
Court has reiterated that the scope of the statute must be broadly and
liberally construed.249 Both the expansive statutory language250 and the
emphatic legislative history251 mandate this approach. Accordingly, the
Court has ―rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional rights that
are encompassed within the [statute‘s] phrase ‗rights, privileges, or
immunities.‘‖252
2. Determining Constitutional Rights Within § 1983‘s Purview:
Dennis v. Higgins
Given § 1983‘s expansive breadth, the Supreme Court has considered
several times whether constitutional provisions, other than those concerning
241. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
242. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
243. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (―The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.‖ (citing Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–57 (1978))).
244. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
245. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974).
246. Blackmun, supra note 241, at 12.
247. 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW
OF SECTION 1983, at § 1:1 (4th ed. 1997).
248. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 185.
249. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105
(1989) (asserting that the Court has ―repeatedly held that the coverage of [§ 1983] must be
broadly construed‖); Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (emphasizing
that § 1983 must be ―liberally and beneficently construed‖).
250. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 445 (1991); Golden State Transit Corp.,
493 U.S. at 105.
251. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 684; David Achtenberg, A ―Milder Measure of
Villainy‖: The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of ―Under Color of‖
Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (closely analyzing the development of the Ku Klux Act and
§ 1983 and concluding that ―this history should dispel the remarkably persistent myth
that . . . Congress never intended the provision to cover constitutional wrongs unless those
wrongs were actually authorized by state law‖).
252. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 445 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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equal protection or fundamental rights, confer an individual right vindicable
under the statute.253 In Dennis v. Higgins,254 the Supreme Court held that
the Dormant Commerce Clause255 conferred individual rights actionable
under § 1983.256 The Supreme Court analyzed the provision according to
three considerations.257 First, the Court asked whether the clause ―create[d]
obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather [did] no more than
express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.‘‖258
Second, the Court inquired whether the ―right‖ asserted was so ―vague and
amorphous‖ to be ―beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.‖259
Third, the Court determined whether the constitutional provision was
―intended to benefit‖ the putative plaintiff.260
Acknowledging that the Commerce Clause‘s text addressed only
Congress, the Court concluded that the long-established understanding of
the Commerce Clause as a limit to states‘ regulatory power supported its
enforcement against states.261 Describing the Commerce Clause as a ―selfexecuting limitation‖ on state power,262 the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress intended its protection to benefit individuals engaged in interstate
commerce.263 Focusing on the third consideration, the Court invoked its
own ―repeated references to ‗rights‘‖ under the Commerce Clause as
support for this conclusion.264
In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants‘ three
arguments that the Commerce Clause‘s protection was not a ―right‖ for
purposes of § 1983 because: first, the clause was only a power-allocating,
rather than a right-conferring provision;265 second, the clause was designed
to promote national economic and political union, rather than benefit

253. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 103 (Supremacy Clause); Carter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885) (Contracts Clause).
254. 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that ―Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.‖ Id. The Dormant Commerce Clause is the principle, inferred
from the Section Eight provision, that ―state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place
an undue burden on interstate commerce.‖ ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450
(3d ed. 2009).
256. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 450.
257. The three-factor inquiry was first articulated to determine whether a statutory
provision created a privately enforceable right. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
340–41 (1997).
258. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 448–49 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106).
259. Id. at 449 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106).
260. Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106).
261. Id. at 447. The Court also emphasized that it had already held that individuals
injured by state action in violation of the Commerce Clause were entitled to relief in a state
court action brought under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)).
262. Id. at 447 (quoting S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984)).
263. Id. at 449.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 447. The Court agreed that the Commerce Clause both allocated power and
conferred an individual right. Id.
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individuals;266 and third, the clause was subject to qualification or
elimination by Congress.267
The Supreme Court recently limited Dennis‘s holding by stating that the
doctrine of comity required individuals asserting state violations of the
Commerce Clause to proceed first in state court, rather than filing directly
in federal court.268 The Court explained that the federal-state incarnation of
comity ―serves to ensure that ‗the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.‘‖269
II. THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION DECREES: WHOSE DUTY IS IT AND WHAT IS
―EVENHANDED‖?
Part II of this Note details the conflict between U.S. Courts of Appeals
over a state‘s obligation to reissue birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive
parents. Courts differ over whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
contains an enforceable obligation of recognition for various state actors, or
a guiding rule for state courts faced with a law or judgment conflicting with
the state‘s own law. In addition, courts are split as to whether issuing a
revised birth certificate falls within the Clause‘s provision for stringent
recognition of sister-state adoptions. In the following sections, this Note
examines the two approaches to each of these issues.
A. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
In Finstuen v. Crutcher,270 the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma
policy of refusing revised birth certificates to out-of-state same-sex
adoptive parents violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.271 The Finstuen
plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of an amendment to Oklahoma‘s
adoption code that prohibited any recognition of out-of-state adoptions by
same-sex couples.272 Oklahoma residents Lucy and Jennifer Doel adopted
266. Id. at 449.
267. Id. at 450. The Court dismissed this argument as ―too much,‖ observing that
Congress could similarly alter or eliminate federal statutory rights. Id. Justice Anthony
Kennedy, writing for the dissent, elaborated on the defendants‘ first two arguments, stating
that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a ―structural provision‖ to ―preserve
economic union and to suppress interstate rivalry.‖ Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
dissent concluded that ―[a]t best,‖ the Court‘s interpretation of the Commerce Clause granted
an individual the ―right to have a judicial determination‖ nullifying the state tax that had
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 458 (citing Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322
(1885)).
268. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2328 (2010).
269. Id. at 2336 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
270. 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
271. Id. at 1156.
272. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.
2007). Three couples originally filed suit, but two were found to lack standing. See
Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1143–51.
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their child, ―E,‖ in California in 2002.273 Upon the Doels‘ return to
Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) refused to
issue a revised birth certificate listing both parents, and instead issued a
certificate that named only Lucy Doel as E‘s mother.274
In 2004, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion stating that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the OSDH to issue revised birth
certificates reflecting the parental relationship in the adoption judgment,
irrespective of whether the parents were eligible to adopt in Oklahoma.275
In response, the Oklahoma legislature amended its adoption code to prohibit
any state agency or court from recognizing a sister-state adoption by two
individuals of the same sex.276 The Doels then renewed their request, and
were again denied a new birth certificate for E that included both mothers‘
names.277
The Doels filed suit in federal court against three state executive
officials: the OSDH Commissioner, the Governor, and the Attorney
General.278 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as
impairment of their constitutional right to travel.279 Explaining their injury,
the Doels recounted an incident when E had to be taken to the emergency
room in an ambulance, and both the ambulance crew and emergency room
personnel stated that only ―E‘s mother‖ could accompany her.280
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the full faith and credit, equal
protection, and due process claims, and ordered that the Commissioner
issue a new birth certificate listing both parents‘ names.281 Only the OSDH
Commissioner, Dr. Michael Crutchen, appealed.282 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commissioner‘s
conduct in enforcing the amendment violated the state‘s obligation under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize a sister-state‘s judgment.283

273. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1142.
274. Id. Since neither woman was E‘s biological parent, Lucy Doel first adopted E, and
then six months later, Jennifer Doel adopted E through a second-parent adoption. Id.
275. See Question Submitted by: Michael Crutcher, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner of
Health and State Health Officer, 2004 Op. Okla. Att‘y Gen. 8, ¶ 14, available at
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=438496.
276. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1142, 1146 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2007)
(―[T]his state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption
by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.‖)).
277. Id. at 1146.
278. Id. at 1142.
279. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139.
280. Id. at 1301.
281. Id. at 1315.
282. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1143, 1156.
283. Id. at 1156. The Tenth Circuit declined to address the Doels‘ additional due process
and equal protection claims. Id.
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1. An Individual May Bring a Federal Cause of Action
Against State Executive Officials for Alleged Violations
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
In Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit permitted the Doels to bring a § 1983
claim against the OSDH Commissioner in his capacity as a state executive
officer.284 Given that two of the original defendants did not pursue an
appeal, the court clarified that Dr. Crutcher was an appropriately named
defendant because plaintiffs may bring suit against a state officer connected
to the enforcement of a challenged law.285 The Tenth Circuit also clarified
the disposition of the case and stated that the Doels were not ―seek[ing] to
enforce their adoption order against Dr. Crutcher in his official
capacity . . . as a matter of claim or issue preclusion.‖286
In dicta, the Finstuen court dismissed as lacking merit OSDH‘s claim
that only a state court‘s denial of a sister-state adoption triggered the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.287 Because this assertion was raised only on
appeal, the court declined to address it substantively.288 Nevertheless, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the Commissioner of Health had ―failed to
fulfill the constitutionally-imposed duty . . . to recognize another state‘s
judgment.‖289
2. Reissuing a Birth Certificate Pursuant to State Law Is
Within the Clause‘s Mandate
Addressing the merits of Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
unamended Oklahoma adoption statute must be applied to all judgments of
adoption, regardless of whether they were held by out-of-state couples that
could not adopt under Oklahoma law.290 First, the court identified ―a clear
legislative expression of Oklahoma‘s public policy contrary to adoptions by
same sex couples.‖291 However, quoting the Supreme Court‘s declaration
in Baker v. General Motor Corp. that there is ―no roving ‗public policy
exception‘ to the full faith and credit due judgments,‖292 the Tenth Circuit
held that Oklahoma was obligated to recognize the Doels‘ California
adoption decree.293
In doing so, the court confirmed that adoption decrees were final
judgments and, therefore, were entitled to the ―unequivocal‖ mandate of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.294 The court rejected the defendant‘s
284. See id. at 1141–42.
285. Id. at 1151 (citing Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel, 411 F.3d 367,
372–73 (2d Cir. 2005)).
286. Id. at 1155.
287. Id. at 1155 n.13.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1155.
290. Id. at 1156.
291. Id. at 1148–49 n.6.
292. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
293. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1152.
294. Id.
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assertion that, despite requiring a judicial sanction, ―adoptions are a matter
of contract between the parties and not a judicial proceeding in the usual
sense of the word.‖295
The court next dismissed the defendants‘ argument that requiring
Oklahoma to issue a birth certificate when presented with a California
adoption decree constituted the extraterritorial application of California
law.296 According to the Tenth Circuit, such an assertion ―improperly
conflate[d] [a state‘s] obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister
state‘s judgment with its authority to apply its own state laws in deciding
what state-specific rights and responsibilities flow from that judgment.‖297
The court emphasized that its ruling was not allowing California ―control
over the effect of its judgment‖ in Oklahoma.298
Instead, the Tenth Circuit stated that it was requiring that state executive
officials apply Oklahoma law in an ―‗evenhanded manner.‘‖299 Therefore,
Oklahoma‘s amended statute violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause
because it categorically denied the ―effective operation‖ of a class of out-ofstate adoption decrees.300
B. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that out-of-state
unmarried adoptive couples were not entitled to amended birth certificates
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.301 In Adar v. Smith, a couple
brought suit against the Louisiana Registrar after she refused to issue a
revised birth certificate for the couple‘s adopted child.302 Mickey Smith
and Oren Adar were an unmarried, same-sex couple who adopted
Louisiana-born ―J‖ in New York in 2006.303 In the adoption proceedings,
Smith and Adar also changed J‘s name from the one appearing on his
original birth certificate.304 The couple then sought to have J‘s Louisiana
birth certificate reissued with both fathers‘ names supplanting those of J‘s
biological parents.305
At the time, section 40 of Louisiana‘s adoption code provided for the
issuance of a new birth certificate with the names of the ―adoptive parents‖
upon the showing of a properly certified out-of-state adoption decree.306
295. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139; see Finstuen, 496
F.3d at 1156.
296. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1153.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1153–54 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1998)).
300. Id. at 1156.
301. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160–61 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 400 (2011).
302. Id. at 149–50.
303. Id. at 149. The Louisiana Registrar‘s surname was also Smith. Id. at 146, 149.
304. Id. at 167 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 149 (majority opinion).
306. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(A), (C) (1990). The statute reads, in relevant part,
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Another Louisiana statute made the Registrar the sole custodian of
Louisiana birth certificates.307 When presented with Smith and Adar‘s
authenticated New York adoption decree, the Louisiana Registrar, Darlene
W. Smith, refused to reissue a birth certificate with both men‘s names.308
In a letter denying the couple‘s request,309 the Registrar posited that
section 40 applied only to adoption decrees possessed by married
parents.310 She reasoned that section 40‘s term ―adoptive parents‖311 meant
only married parents because, pursuant to a separate statute, Louisiana
allowed only a ―husband and wife‖ to jointly adopt a child.312 The
Registrar also relied on an Attorney General advisory opinion,313 which
concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Louisiana to
recognize out-of-state adoption judgments that violated Louisiana‘s ―strong
public policy‖ against both adoption by unmarried individuals and same-sex
marriage.314
The family sued the Louisiana Registrar under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that her actions violated Adar, Smith, and J‘s rights under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.315 As to injury,
the family alleged that its inability to obtain an accurate birth certificate had
caused problems related to obtaining medical insurance for J through Adar
or Smith‘s employer.316 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause claim, ruling that the Clause required the defendants to
recognize the out-of-state adoption judgment.317
A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district court in 2010, holding that final
adoption decrees were entitled to exacting credit.318 The panel also
dismissed the Registrar‘s interpretation of section 40 as defying the

When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any
other state or territory of the United States, the state registrar may create a new
record of birth in the archives upon presentation of a properly certified copy of the
final decree of adoption . . . . Upon receipt of the certified copy of the decree, the
state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, showing . . . [t]he names of
the adoptive parents . . . .
Id.
307. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149 n.1 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2).
308. Id. at 149.
309. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008), rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d
146.
310. See Adar, 639 F.3d at 149–50.
311. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C).
312. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149–50 (citing LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1992)).
313. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
314. See Must the Vital Records Registrar Give Full Faith and Credit to an Out of State
Adoption Judgment Obtained by Two Unmarried Individuals Adopting Jointly?, 06 Op. La.
Att‘y Gen. 0325 (2007), available at http://www.ag.state.la.us/shared/viewdoc.aspx?Type=
4&doc=18900.
315. Adar, 639 F.3d at 150.
316. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859 n.1.
317. Id. at 862.
318. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 719–20 (5th Cir.), vacated, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir.
2010).
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statute‘s unambiguous meaning.319 Finally, the Fifth Circuit panel
emphasized that it was Louisiana‘s own statute that directed the Registrar to
reissue birth certificates, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause required
that section 40 be applied in an ―evenhanded‖ manner.320
A few months later, the Fifth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc.321 The
en banc majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones,
reversed the district court and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did
not govern the actions of a state executive official,322 and, even if it did, the
Registrar‘s refusal was not unconstitutional because issuing a birth
certificate was beyond the recognition required by the Clause.323 A keenly
worded dissent324 argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposed a
duty on state officials, and therefore created individual ―correlative rights‖
vindicable under § 1983.325
1. The Clause Does Not Govern the Actions of a State Executive Official
and Does Not Create Individual Rights Actionable Under § 1983
In Adar, the Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause governed only state courts and not any other state actors.326
According to the en banc majority, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
introduced only a ―rule of decision‖ to guide courts—―[n]o more, no
less.‖327 The court explained that the Clause governed only the res judicata
effect of a judgment,328 which arose only when litigation was pursued in
another state or federal court. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was a rule for state courts, rather than an
obligation imposed on all state actors generally.329
Since the full faith and credit command fell only on courts, the Adar
majority declared that ―it is incoherent to speak of vindicating full faith and
319. Id. at 718–19.
320. Id. at 714 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 224 (1998)).
321. Adar, 622 F.3d 426.
322. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 154 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
400 (2011).
323. Id. at 160–61.
324. See id. at 166 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (―Only by judicial legerdemain, is the en banc
majority able to conclude [that the Louisiana Registrar did not violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause] . . . . I lament that, in its determination to sweep this high-profile and
admittedly controversial case out the federal door . . . the en banc majority . . . strips
federal . . . courts of subject matter jurisdiction . . . [and] [u]nduly cabins, if not emasculates
[Supreme Court precedent].‖).
325. Id. at 165–87.
326. Id. at 154 (majority opinion).
327. Id. at 151. The Fifth Circuit majority cited Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174
(1988), for the proposition that the Clause was a rule of decision. Adar, 639 F.3d at 153 n.13;
see supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
328. Adar, 639 F.3d at 153; see supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. The en banc
majority noted the Supreme Court‘s distinction between the credit owed to laws and
judgments. Adar, 639 F.3d at 154 n.3 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232
(1998)). The Fifth Circuit described the credit owed to judgments as ―simpler‖ than the
credit owed to laws. Id.
329. Adar, 639 F.3d at 154.
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credit rights against non-judicial state actors.‖330 The Fifth Circuit majority
acknowledged that the Supreme Court ―ha[d] at times referred to the clause
in terms of individual ‗rights,‘‖ but asserted that the Court ―consistently
identifie[d] the violators of that right as state courts.‖331 The court
therefore ruled that the § 1983 cause of action could not be sustained
against state executive officials to enforce full faith and credit for out-ofstate adoption decrees.332
In so holding, the en banc majority concluded that Adar, Smith, and J
should have sought to compel the issuance of a revised birth certificate in
Louisiana state court, rather than through a federal cause of action.333
Under the majority‘s construction, only a state court‘s denial of the parents‘
request would implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and even then
only upon Supreme Court review of state court decisions.334
Observing in a footnote that the Full Faith and Credit Clause addressed
itself to ―each state,‖ not to ―each state‘s court,‖ the en banc majority
acknowledged that one might consider its interpretation ―curious.‖335 The
Fifth Circuit suggested that a contrary holding would create a ―serious
anomaly‖ whereby individuals pursuing § 1983 claims for violations by
state executive officials ―would have [the] considerable advantage‖ of
immediate federal court redress.336 Individuals facing violations by state
courts, on the other hand, would obtain federal redress only upon Supreme
Court review.337
In a specially concurring opinion, Judge Leslie H. Southwick
acknowledged that only a single Supreme Court sentence precluded the
dissent‘s ―good arguments‖ that the Full Faith and Credit Clause conferred
individual rights for purposes of § 1983.338 The concurrence cited
Thompson,339 in which the Supreme Court had adopted language from
1904‘s Northern Securities when stating that the Clause ―only prescribes a
rule by which courts . . . are to be guided.‖340 But for this recent
articulation, Judge Southwick would have considered Northern Securities
an ―anachronism from a day before the rediscovery of Section 1983.‖341
Accordingly, Judge Southwick joined the Fifth Circuit majority‘s holding

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 153–54.
333. Id. at 158.
334. See id. (―After Appellees‘ case has been submitted to the state courts, the full faith
and credit clause may provide the federal question to support Supreme Court review.‖ (citing
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962))).
335. Id. at 154 n.6.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 164–65 (Southwick, J., specially concurring).
339. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
340. Adar, 639 F.3d at 164 (Southwick, J., specially concurring); see Thompson, 484 U.S.
at 182–83 (quoting Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904)); see supra notes 152–
53 and accompanying text.
341. Adar, 639 F.3d at 164 (Southwick, J., specially concurring).
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that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not create a right enforceable
against state executive officers.342
2. Issuing a Birth Certificate Is Enforcement of a Judgment,
and Therefore Outside of the Clause‘s Mandate
The Fifth Circuit majority then ruled in the alternative that, even if the
Full Faith and Credit Clause did govern the actions of a state official, the
Louisiana Registrar did not deny recognition to the New York adoption
decree when she declined to reissue a new birth certificate for J.343 The
court distinguished between recognizing the existence of the parental
relationship—which the Registrar did, and was obligated to do under the
Clause—and reissuing the birth certificate, a separate act of enforcement.344
According to the majority, issuing a revised birth certificate fell in the
―heartland of enforcement‖ and was therefore beyond the mandate of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.345 The court cited the Supreme Court for the
proposition that the Clause ―does not compel ‗a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate.‘‖346 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
explained, outside of the res judicata effect required by the Clause,
Louisiana was the ―sole mistress‖ of directing the rights created by out-ofstate adoption decrees.347 In so holding, the en banc majority reasoned that
a new birth certificate was an ―incidental benefit[]‖ to adoption, rather than
a right created by the couple‘s New York adoption.348
Finally, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana had fulfilled its obligation
under Baker to apply its laws concerning the ―enforcement‖ of out-of-state
judgments in an ―evenhanded‖ way.349 The en banc majority stated that
because Louisiana did not permit any unmarried couples to obtain revised
birth certificates, the state was under no obligation to issue one to Adar and
Smith.350 The Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the manner in which
Louisiana enforced sister-state adoptions did not violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.351

342. Id. Finding the case resolved by this question, Judge Southwick would not have
addressed whether the Louisiana Registrar‘s actions constituted a failure to recognize the
New York adoption decree. Id. at 165.
343. Id. at 158 (majority opinion).
344. See id. at 159 (―The Registrar acknowledged that even though she would not issue
the requested birth certificate with both names, the Registrar recognizes [Adar and Smith] as
the legal parents of their adopted child.‖).
345. Id. at 160.
346. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pac.
Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 161.
349. Id. at 159 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)); see supra
notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
350. Adar, 639 F.3d at 161.
351. Id.
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III. CLASH OF POLICIES: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF OUT-OFSTATE ADOPTION DECREES UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
As detailed in Part II, federal circuit courts have split regarding the effect
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges state officials to give to out-ofstate adoption decrees. The conflict accentuates the Supreme Court‘s
distinction between recognition and enforcement under the Clause.352 The
uncertainty over the Clause‘s command reflects the tension between the
competing interests that the Clause balances: a federal interest in national
unity;353 each state‘s interest in asserting its own policies within its
territory;354 each state‘s interest in the finality and integrity of its
judgments;355 and individuals‘ interest in the security of rights and
obligations established by judgment.356 This Note argues that the federal,
state, and individual interests in finality and unity outweigh a state‘s policy
preferences. This Note therefore asserts that states must give meaningful
recognition to out-of-state adoption decrees pursuant to the Clause, even
when such judgments are contrary to the state‘s own policy.
Part III.A addresses the potential misapplication of the division between
enforcement and recognition, arguing that states may not apply the
distinction to undermine the substantive rights created by judgments. Part
III.B asserts that, in addition to balancing state and federal power, the
Clause confers an individual right to recognition of sister-state judgments
that is vindicable under § 1983 when refused by a state official.
A. Clarifying the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
Although the Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between a
judgment‘s recognition and enforcement for purposes of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause,357 states may not reframe this distinction to escape their
constitutional obligation. It is well established that states must recognize
out-of-state judgments and may apply their own enforcement measures.358
To comply with the Clause, however, states also must apply their
enforcement mechanisms in an ―evenhanded manner.‖359 Thus, both
recognition and enforcement fall under the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s
command.
Although the distinction allows for local variance in enforcement
measures,360 it does not constitute a de facto public policy exception to a
state‘s constitutional obligation. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that
there is ―no roving ‗public policy exception‘‖ to the credit owed to

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92–94, 110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95, 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96–97, 136–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
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judgments.361 Instead, the distinction reflects the Clause‘s balancing of
state and federal interests. Though formulated as a unifying instrument of
federalism,362 the Clause does not demand uniformity in policy among
states.363 Instead, the Clause requires uniform respect for the integrity and
finality of sister-state judgments.364
The finality of sister-state adoption decrees includes the legal status of
parent and child.365 The Supreme Court has long established that
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks not only to the
facial ―validity‖ of a judgment, but also its substance or ―effect.‖366 The
effect of the judicial sanction of adoption is a legal relationship of parent
and child.367 A state‘s refusal to recognize a legally created status as
adoptive parent or child violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s stringent
command regarding judgments.
Even if the issuance of a revised birth certificate is termed ―enforcement‖
of ―incidental rights‖ of adoption,368 states should not be able to manipulate
their enforcement provisions to avoid their Full Faith and Credit Clause
obligation to recognize sister-state judgments.369 The Supreme Court‘s
mandate that a state apply its enforcement mechanisms in an ―evenhanded
manner‖ prohibits that state from undermining or undoing the substantive
rights created by a judgment.370 In the context of judgments, the Clause‘s
command orders ―submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected
in the judgment of another State.‖371 Thus, the federal, state, and individual
interests underlying the Clause‘s strict command for judgments outweigh a
single state‘s interest in asserting its own policy, in the context of
judgments.372
Interpreting a statute that refers only to ―adoptive parents‖ to exclude
same-sex couples based on separate statutory provisions improperly
incorporates public policy into a state‘s recognition of sister-state
judgments.373 Where an in-state statute provides for in-state operation of
out-of-state adoption decrees, a state registrar should not be free to
discriminate based on any disagreement with another state‘s policy that
gave rise to the judgment.374 This discrimination against other states‘
policies is precisely what the Framers sought to end with the Full Faith and
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See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141, 344–45 and accompanying text.
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Credit Clause.375 This limit on state sovereignty is a ―price‖ of a federal
system.376
Furthermore, a state executive official‘s interpretation of statutory
language to withhold recognition or enforcement undermines the separation
of powers principle underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause.377 By
substituting her own interpretation for that of the state legislature, so as to
undermine the validity and integrity of a sister-state judgment, a state
official infringes on the authority of both the judiciary and legislature to
determine state policies.378 Therefore, the distinction between enforcement
and recognition does not render the Clause powerless to a state‘s
application of its own enforcement mechanisms to an out-of-state judgment.
B. A State’s Binding Obligation Under the Clause Confers an Individual
Right to Equal Recognition that Is Vindicable Under § 1983
While the Supreme Court has never stated that § 1983 can be used for
Full Faith and Credit Clause violations, its application of § 1983 to the
Commerce Clause indicates that the Court may be willing to recognize its
use in Full Faith and Credit Clause cases because both clauses serve to
unify states by limiting state authority. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
equated the Clause‘s ―unifying force‖ to that of the Commerce Clause.379
The Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s history and text, as well as the Supreme
Court precedent that has given meaning to its command, support the
conclusion that by prohibiting state discrimination against out-of-state
judgments held by individuals, the Clause confers correlative, enforceable
rights on individuals.
Moreover, the Court has reiterated that § 1983 must be broadly, liberally,
and beneficently construed to ensure federal protection of constitutional
rights.380 Permitting a § 1983 cause of action for violations of the Clause is
consistent with the purpose of § 1983—to ―interpose‖ the federal courts to
guard against state officers who, under the badge of state authority, deprive
individuals of constitutionally granted rights.381 It is therefore reasonable
to conclude that when a state official evades his constitutional obligation to
recognize rights created by a sister-state‘s judgment, such as the parentchild relationship created by adoption, the holder of those rights is entitled
to bring suit in federal court.
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1. The Clause Imposes a Binding Obligation on States,
Including State Executive Officials
The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a binding constitutional duty
on states. By its plain language,382 a deliberate choice of the Framers,383
the Clause is a self-executing limitation on state power.384 The Framers
intended the Clause to transform the states from ―independent foreign
sovereigns, each free to ignore‖ out-of-state judgments, to integral parts
welded together through federal obligations.385 The Full Faith and Credit
Clause eliminated a state‘s discretion to disregard the judgments of sisterstates based on its own policy preferences.386
The Supreme Court‘s previous treatment of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not control the question of whether the Clause reaches state
officials. The cases in which the Court stated that the Clause only
prescribes a ―rule by which courts . . . are to be guided . . . in the progress of
a pending suit‖387 do not limit the Clause‘s mandate to only state courts.388
In 1904‘s Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,389 the Supreme Court‘s
explanation came in response to the state‘s assertion of a Full Faith and
Credit Clause violation in an attempt to remove its state law case to federal
court.390 Since Minnesota asserted that a private corporation avoided
recognition of Minnesota‘s own antitrust laws,391 it is reasonable to
conclude that the statement referred to the Clause‘s function in a court‘s
choice-of-law analysis.392 In this context, the Clause serves as a guiding
rule, alongside a forum state‘s public policy considerations, in determining
the application of sister-state laws.393 In addition, the Court‘s declaration
that the Clause had ―nothing to do with the conduct of individuals or
corporations‖394 is correctly understood as dismissing the state‘s contention
that a private entity also had full faith and credit duties under the Clause‘s
―in each state‖ language, rather than excluding individuals as beneficiaries
of the Clause.
Though in 1988‘s Thompson v. Thompson,395 the Supreme Court echoed
Northern Securities‘s ―guiding rule‖ language, it responded to a plaintiff‘s
attempt to appeal to federal courts to determine the validity of two

382. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (―Full faith and Credit shall be given in each
State . . . .‖); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 327, 340–41 and accompanying text.
389. 194 U.S. 48 (1904).
390. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
395. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
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competing state custody determinations.396 This is distinct from a claim
alleging a state official‘s affirmative denial of full faith and credit.
Thompson is not controlling because it addressed only a private claim
brought against another private individual.397
Therefore, there is no controlling Supreme Court statement as to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause‘s reach. Accordingly, the Clause‘s plain language
should control, which binds state executive officials and state courts.
Although typically invoked by litigants after a state court has refused to
accord preclusive effect to the substance of a sister-state‘s judgment,398 the
Clause unambiguously addresses ―states.‖399
2. The Right to Meaningful Recognition of Adoption
Is Sufficiently Specific for Federal Courts to Enforce
For litigants holding judicially created rights, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause guarantees a right that is sufficiently specific for federal courts to
enforce under § 1983. In contrast to the accommodating rule applied to
sister-state statutes,400 the Clause‘s ―exacting obligation‖ for sister-state
judgments defines a clear right to nationwide recognition.401 Whereas the
credit due to statutory law is subject to a somewhat vague public policy
exception,402 the credit due to judicial rights is governed by an ―iron‖ full
faith and credit requirement that bars exceptions.403
The judicial sanction of adoption bestows a legal status determination of
parent or child, and entitles the individuals who are party to an adoption to
nationwide recognition and respect of that status.404 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause secures recognition not only of the evidentiary validity of a
judgment, but its substance or ―effect.‖405 The legal status of parent and
child is therefore specific enough to merit enforcement.
3. The Framers Intended the Clause to Benefit Litigants
by Ensuring Finality and Certainty
The history and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicate that
the Framers intended the Clause to benefit individuals whose rights,
statuses, and obligations were created by judgments. By deliberately
imposing a binding obligation on states,406 the Framers protected litigants
from the ―accordion-like‖ predilections of states presented with sister-state
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judgments.407 The Clause not only guarantees that judicially confirmed
rights are preserved as litigants travel among states, but also advances the
―maximum enforcement‖ of those rights.408
Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained regarding the Commerce
Clause in Dennis v. Higgins,409 the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses
itself to states and textually balances power among states and between the
federal and state governments410 is not prohibitive to determining that the
provision also confers corresponding individual rights.411 Indeed, all the
defendants‘ unavailing arguments in Dennis regarding the Commerce
Clause similarly fail when applied to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a power-allocating provision,
it is also a substantive limitation on a state‘s treatment of out-of-state
judgments.412 While the Framers designed the Clause to promote national
unity, they also intended the full faith and credit mandate to benefit
individuals who held ―obligations created . . . by the judicial proceedings‖
of other states.413 Finally, though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
arguably subject to qualification by Congress pursuant to the Effects
Clause,414 both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Full Faith and Credit
Act currently secure the maximum recognition of sister-state judgments.415
CONCLUSION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is a meaningful imperative for states to
respect sister-state judgments. Where one state has an interest in generating
its own distinctive judgments, and another has an interest in asserting its
own statutory policies, the Clause at times requires that a state‘s local
policy give way to the overriding combination of federal, state, and
individual interests. Federalism and finality outweigh a single state‘s
interest in its own policies.
Even so, to balance these competing interests, the Supreme Court has
distinguished between a state‘s obligation of recognition and enforcement
pursuant to the Clause. Under both standards, however, the Clause
prohibits states from undermining the substantive rights and obligations
sanctioned by a judgment. A state cannot undo substantive recognition by
reframing the application of its enforcement measures. The framework of
meaningful recognition best summarizes the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s
command. Meaningful recognition allows for the maximum enforcement
of judicially created rights within the Clause‘s careful balance of interests.
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